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Abstract— The literature on e-voting systems has many 
examples of discussion of the correctness of the computer 
and communication algorithms of such systems, as well as 
discussions of their vulnerabilities. However, a gap in the 
literature concerns the practical need (before adoption of 
a specific e-voting system) for a complete case 
demonstrating that the system as a whole has sufficiently 
high probability of exhibiting the desired properties when 
in use in an actual election. This paper discusses the 
problem of producing such a case, with reference to a 
specific system: a version of the Prêt à Voter scheme for 
voter-verifiable e-voting. We show a possible organisation 
of a case in terms of four main requirements – accuracy, 
privacy, termination and ‘trustedness’– and show some of 
the detailed organisation that such a case should have, the 
diverse kinds of evidence that needs to be gathered and 
some of the interesting difficulties that arise. 
Keywords: assurance case, socio-technical systems, e-
voting, crypotography, trust, security 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents recent progress in 
understanding the concrete needs of a case for an 
electronic voting (e-voting) system. “Case” here is 
understood in the sense derived from safety 
engineering [1], as in “safety case”, “dependability 
case” or “assurance case”. “E-voting system” means 
the combination of vote-casting, ballot transmission 
and counting, auditing and monitoring systems: a large 
scale, largely open, socio-technical system (i.e. formed 
by machine, people, procedures), posing important 
challenges for the development of a case. 
E-voting has been presented as a suitable solution 
for many of the limitations of conventional paper-
based voting technology, such as human errors in vote 
counting, limited usability of the voting methods, flaws 
in the application of voting procedures, fraud, etc. 
After some successful experiences in non-
governmental elections, many countries are conducting 
experiments in political areas as well [2]. However, e-
voting systems are still subject of debate and 
controversies, which are slowing down the adoption of 
such systems on a large scale [3]. Several instances of 
fraud and misconduct and public exposure of shoddy 
practices in development and certification, for 
example, have decreased the trust in e-voting systems 
[4]. In order to increase acceptance of e-voting 
systems, recent research efforts have focused on 
making such systems auditable (or verifiable) so that 
all actions taken during the elections can be inspected 
and verified by everyone [5, 6, 7]. Most of current 
developments involve some kind of cryptographic 
protocol to ensure that basic requirements, such as 
privacy (i.e. no link can be made between a vote and a 
voter) and accuracy (i.e. no vote can be altered, deleted 
or invalidated) are met, without requiring the 
certification of large quantities of voting equipment, 
that is, by verifying the election rather than the 
computer system [8, 9]. In software engineering terms, 
by run-time checking rather than just by software 
verification, this is achieved through a high degree of 
transparency, using a combination of cryptography, 
monitoring and auditing (e.g. via the Web) to ensure 
privacy while detecting vote tampering. An example of 
this development is Prêt à Voter [10], which is used in 
the case study reported in this paper. 
Technical arguments for using these systems have 
relied on the demonstrable strength of the algorithms: 
violations of accuracy or privacy are detected with 
very high probability if the implementations satisfy 
certain properties and voters and officials follow 
certain procedures [11]. Thus, if the election completes 
with very few errors detected, then it will have 
delivered the correct vote count with very high 
probability. To deploy such a system in an election, 
though, decision makers would need a “case” showing 
that the whole system (not only these 
auditing/monitoring algorithms) is sufficiently robust 
in presence of realistic human behaviour, including 
errors and re-working of procedures for both normal 
use and exception handling. Such a case must be 
complete from four viewpoints: referring to the 
specific system  (software implementation, machines, 
polling station workers, etc.) rather than design only 
(algorithm, procedures) in a specific environment or 
range of environments; covering all required properties 
of an election (e.g. it is easy to focus on e.g. the 
requirement for accuracy without adequate 
consideration for the somewhat conflicting requirement 
of privacy), and the whole process resulting in 
satisfaction of these properties (e.g., many papers focus 
on the efficacy of the safeguards for detection of 
integrity violations, rather than the probability of a 
correct final count). 
In the remainder of this paper we discuss the 
advances and difficulties in producing such a case, 
with reference to the Prêt à Voter e-voting scheme. 
II. PRET A VOTER: VOTER-VERIFIABLE E-VOTING 
Prêt à Voter [10] is an end-to-end cryptographic 
scheme for booth-based e-voting. The key innovation 
of the Prêt à Voter approach is that the vote is encoded 
using a randomised candidate list.  
Suppose that our voter is called Anne. At the 
polling station, Anne chooses at random a ballot form, 
an example of which is shown in Figure 1. In the 
booth, Anne makes her selection in the usual way by 
placing a cross in the right hand column against the 
candidate of choice. She separates the left and right 
hand strips along a thoughtfully provided perforation 
and discards the left hand strip. She is left with the 
right hand strip which now constitutes her privacy 
protected receipt, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Ballot form and detached receipt 
 
Anne now exits the booth clutching her receipt, 
registers with an official and casts her receipt. The 
receipt is placed over a recording device (an optical 
reader or similar) which records the random value at 
the bottom of the strip and records which cell she 
marked with her X. The original paper receipt is 
digitally signed and returned to her to keep. After the 
receipt is recorded, the system verifies the validity of 
the ballot and transmits it to a Web Bulletin Board 
(WBB), an append-only secure web server.   
The randomisation of the candidate list on each 
ballot form ensures that the receipt does not reveal the 
way she voted, ensuring secrecy. The value printed on 
the bottom of the receipt (the “onion”) is the key to 
extraction of the vote. Buried cryptographically in the 
“onion” is the information needed to reconstruct the 
candidate order and so extract the vote encoded on the 
receipt. This information is encrypted with secret keys 
shared across a number of tellers. Thus, only a quorum 
of tellers acting together is able to interpret the vote 
encoded on the receipt. 
During and after the election, voters can visit the 
WBB and confirm that their receipts appear correctly. 
Once vote-casting is over, the tellers take over and 
perform anonymising mixes and decryption of the 
receipts. All the intermediate stages of this process are 
posted to the WBB and are audited later.  
III. VOTING REQUIREMENTS 
Various lists of voting requirements have been 
proposed in the past when discussing e-voting systems 
(see [6, 12, 11, 13] amongst many others). Examples of 
proposed requirements include: privacy of the 
individual ballot, individual verifiability, ballot box 
security, count integrity, public verifiability, 
transparency, robustness, fairness, legitimacy, 
uniqueness. Although useful, these lists tend be 
formulated in rather informal ways and mix together 
the actual top-level requirements with the means 
assumed to be used to satisfy the requirements 
(possibly coloured by assumptions about specific 
implementations). 
We have opted for a smaller set of well-defined 
high level requirements which arguably encompass 
(and, to some extent, expand on) the requirements 
proposed by other authors and are consistent with 
many of the legal and regulatory requirements [14]. 
Our requirements are: accuracy, privacy, “trustedness” 
and successful termination. We define these in some 
detail below; and then introduce what we propose as 
the top claim for the case for Prêt à Voter. 
 
Accuracy requirement. Accuracy requires that if (and 
when) the election system declares the election 
successfully completed, the final election result that it 
has produced will match (within reasonable margins of 
error) the voting intentions of all legitimate voters as 
they enter the ballot booth. Margins of error would be 
defined in terms of a statistical distribution of the error. 
This requirement includes some usability requirements 
(voters being able to record successfully whatever vote 
they have decided to enter), but it does not deal with 
the issue whether voters vote as they “really want” (i.e. 
without bribing, intimidation etc.) which is dealt with 
in the other requirements (e.g. the privacy 
requirement).   
Privacy requirement. For this requirement to be met, 
under no circumstance (not even with the connivance 
of the voter), shall any person gain from the election 
system evidence of for whom or for what the voter 
voted, apart from the vote tallies that the election 
system is required to publish. 
‘Trustedness’ requirement. We use the made up 
neologism “trustedness” as a term that combines 
aspects of “trust” and “acceptability”. We say that this 
requirement has been satisfied if most citizens trust the 
election process “enough” to take part, using it as 
required (i.e., they will act on the assumption that the 
other three requirements are met), and to accept its 
results. This requirement needs to be stated in a way 
that it takes into account all the reasons why people 
may not want to vote because of the system. 
Successful Termination requirement. We say that this 
requirement has been satisfied if the election system 
declares the election successfully completed, by a 
deadline specified in its requirements. This implies that 
the system is robust and resilient enough in the face of 
accidental and malicious threats that could make it 
abort (for instance, the election might have to abort if 
an attack is detected after it has changed many votes in 
a way that cannot be undone; or if a fault has destroyed 
a lot of votes already cast). That is, the election system 
has sufficient ability to resist, or recover from the 
effects of, the attacks and accidental faults that will 
occur in the election. So, it has a very high probability 
to succeed with all the above requirements being met. 
Top Claim of the Case. We posited that specifying 
absolute numerical (probabilistic) requirements of 
these four categories would be difficult for the stake 
holders in the adoption of an election system, and thus 
the requirement would be stated in relative terms, i.e., 
the case should demonstrate that, for each requirement, 
the Prêt à Voter system implementation (machines, 
procedures, voter training, etc.) under consideration is 
at least as good as the standard paper based system 
(henceforth, POPS, short for “Plain Old Paper 
System”) that it replaces.  
IV. STRUCTURING  THE CASE 
The purpose of a “case” is to show that the whole 
body of evidence really proves the claim made. In 
designing a complex argument (a case), as for any 
other design, it is important to follow a structure that 
will make the completed case mentally manageable for 
the writer and reader alike. Therefore we start by 
illustrating the general structure that the case for Prêt à 
Voter may have and then proceed to some interesting 
examples of details of claims, sub-claims, arguments 
and supporting evidence that could be deployed.  
The work described here is based on an 
interdisciplinary collaboration, including software 
engineers, human factor specialists and cryptography 
and security experts. Various activities were conducted 
to develop an integrated system description, which 
would then partly inform the construction of the case. 
These activities included: task modelling and HAZOP-
style analyses [15], probabilistic modelling (already 
introduced partly in [3]),  work on design rationale 
management [16] and a small-scale trial of Prêt à 
Voter, which looked at usability and acceptability 
aspects of  the system [17]. 
A. Case Skeleton 
Our work in the development, organisation and 
structuring of the case was guided by the following 
considerations: 
• at an abstract level the main claims we want to 
prove about Prêt à Voter are the four requirements 
defined earlier, 
• to obtain a comprehensible structure for a case, we 
organise the lower level claims of the case around 
identifiable functions in Prêt à Voter, which may 
or may not map one-to-one to physical (hardware, 
software, or human) components, 
• to prove the claims for the 4 top requirements, 
with respect to POPS, one can then identify 
homologous functions in both systems and 
demonstrate an improvement with respect to each 
function rather than for Prêt à Voter as a whole; 
clearly, the specific POPS considered will 
determine the evidence available and the types of 
comparisons performed.. 
Additionally, for functions of the voting system that 
are susceptible to be attacked by adversaries or 
corrupted by technical faults and human error, we 
observed that the claim will naturally need to be 
structured into four “stages” or “layers”, as also typical 
of safety reasoning. Each layer will be associated with 
a sub-claim about a probability parameter. For 
instance, if we think of attacks aiming to affect 
accuracy rather than to violate privacy: 
• the attack, “foul play”, or fault, which occurs with 
a certain probability,  
• the data corruption caused by that attack (or 
fault); this corruption also occurs with a certain 
probability, conditional on the attack (or fault), 
• the detection of the corruption; the detection also 
has an associated conditional probability (failure 
of detection may cause accuracy violations), 
 
Figure 2. Partial decomposition for the sub-claim about “transmission of digital receipts” (showing part of the claim-argument-evidence tree) 
 
• the recovery from the detected corruption and the 
conditional probability of that recovery (failure 
of recovery may lead to non-termination). 
 
We will see that there might be countless such 
attack-corruption-detection-recovery chains, each for 
one category of corruption causes. Part of the 
challenge is to partition such scenarios into a small 
set of categories amenable to sound argumentation. 
As noted, the top claim of our case for Prêt à 
Voter is decomposed into 4 top sub-claims, each 
referring to the satisfaction of one of the 4 voting 
requirements introduced above. Each sub-claim will 
state that, with Prêt à Voter, the corresponding 
requirement will be met, with high enough 
probability, at the election for which the case is being 
written. We use the phrase “with high enough 
probability” to mean that for an election using Prêt à 
Voter those requirements are, at least, as likely to be 
met as they would be in a conventional POPs-based 
election. For requirements expressed as probability 
distributions (e.g. of the size of numerical errors), the 
claim will be that Prêt à Voter is “stochastically 
better” than POPS. 
To illustrate our claim decomposition approach, 
we focus now on the sub-claim concerning accuracy.  
We have subdivided the accuracy claim in three 
further sub-claims, each relevant to a different 
accuracy-related component of the e-voting process, 
namely: 1) Voter accuracy, which addresses the 
voter’s task of filling the form at the voting booth; 2) 
“Ballot box” integrity, which, in Prêt à Voter, refers 
to what happens to the ballots while they are being 
scanned, digitally transmitted to and stored in the 
WBB before the tellers’ cryptographic 
transformations; the counterpart in POPS is what 
happens to the ballot forms while being deposited in 
the box and, later, while they remain stored there; 3) 
Ballot count integrity, which refers, in Prêt à Voter, 
to the cryptographic transformations conducted by 
tellers on the digital ballot receipts and the automatic 
count; its counterpart POPS is the manual counting of 
the ballots after these are taken out of the box.  
Each of the above processes can be further sub-
divided into smaller components, and their 
corresponding sub-claims, until we reach subclaims 
for which sound arguments can be conveniently 
stated using available evidence We might then still 
decompose each such sub-claim into sub-claims. For 
example, as noted earlier, many corruption detection 
processes can be subdivided into sub-claims 
corresponding to the layers of defence in the attack-
corruption-detection-recovery chain introduced 
earlier.  
B. Example: “Ballot Box” Integrity Claim 
We present here an example developed for a sub-
claim of the “Ballot Box” Integrity sub-claim of the 
top “Accuracy” claim.  
“Ballot box” integrity involves, at least, two 
separate functions in Prêt à Voter: 1) the transmission 
of encrypted electronic ballot receipts from the 
recording device (scanner in the polling station, 
which digitised the ballot form filled in by the voter) 
to the Web Bulletin Board (WBB), which, at this 
stage, is our electronic “ballot box”; 2) the storage of 
the electronic ballot receipts in the WBB.  
The description that follows focuses on the first 
sub-component (i.e., the one about ballot 
transmission). The claim we want to make here is that 
undetected corruption of the transmission of 
encrypted electronic ballot receipts to the WBB is at 
least as unlikely as it is for its counterpart in POPS.  
In POPS the corruption of this part of the system 
would involve illegitimately or mistakenly removing, 
replacing, adding (“stuffing”), or damaging ballots as 
they go into the ballot box. Ballot box “stuffing” in 
POPS is well known. In Prêt à Voter, the corruption 
of this part of the system can occur in four different 
ways: 1) a valid electronic receipt is not transmitted 
to the WBB (the vote has been “deleted”); 2) the 
value of an electronic receipt is altered so that, when 
decrypted, it will give a different value from that 
entered by the voter; 3) the value  of the electronic 
receipt is altered, but so as to make the ballot invalid 
(equivalent to making a paper ballot unreadable); 4) 
extra digital ballot receipts, valid in appearance, but 
not corresponding to a genuine vote are added 
(equivalent to “stuffing” the ballot box).  
Figure 2 shows a possible decomposition for the 
sub-claim about electronic receipt transmission, 
taking into account the 4 possible deviations of the 
process. The graphical formalism is that of ASCE 
(Assurance and Safety Case Environment) [18], a 
powerful “safety case editor” that we use in  this 
project. Sub-claims are represented by ellipsoid 
shapes, arguments by “rounded rectangles” and 
supporting evidence by plain rectangles. For each 
deviation, a claim is made that the undetected 
occurrence of the deviation is unlikely enough (i.e., at 
least as unlikely as the corresponding deviation in 
POPS). Each of these 4 sub-claims can be further 
decomposed into at least 3 lower sub-claims, namely, 
the “attack”, the “corruption” and the “detection” 
parts of the “attack-corruption-detection-recovery 
chain” discussed earlier.  We do not consider the 
“recovery” part since detection should be enough to 
avoid accuracy violations. 
The figure makes this decomposition explicit for 
only one of the possible deviations, namely, ballot 
“stuffing” but similar decompositions are implicit for 
the other 3 deviations. Similarly, the lower levels of 
the argumentation are again made explicit only for 
the “detection” sub-claim under the “stuffing” sub-
claim. Although not expanded in the figure, both the 
“attack” and the “corruption” sub-claims are 
decomposed in similar ways. 
The “stuffing” detection sub-claim is shown to be 
supported by two arguments: 
1. One concerns the use of a digital signature for 
every ballot “onion”, a “hash” with the 
authority’s private key, which allows a series of 
corruption detection  mechanisms 
2. Corruption detection mechanisms in Prêt à Voter 
include a variety of checks (e.g., the polling 
station PC compares the receipt against the list of 
audited, cast or invalidated receipts in the WBB). 
The bottom part of the tree in the figure 
corresponds to the evidence supporting one of the 
arguments for the sub-claim. For POPS, evidence 
would need to come from experiments about the 
effectiveness of detection procedures (historical 
records would not help, as undetected incidents 
would not normally be recorded). For Prêt à Voter, 
the evidence would come from a combination of 
proof of the efficacy of the cryptographic algorithms 
and statistical testing of the software implementation 
of the algorithms. For other functions that include 
human actions, trials would be needed to estimate the 
frequency of human error (including the effects of 
potential reduced vigilance due to reliance on 
computer support, to repeated false alarms, etc). 
The partial case sketched so far already highlights 
some interesting challenges. A line of argumentation 
that is difficult to represent in the case is, for 
example, the deterrent effect that the easy detection 
of ballot “stuffing” corruption can have in the 
potential attackers of the system: because attackers 
know that their attack is very likely to be detected, 
they are less likely to attempt it. In this way the claim 
about detection becomes a piece of evidence 
supporting the claim about the likelihood of the cause 
of the attack occurring. However, as often happens in 
cases, we may want not to use this extra “comforting” 
argument since assessing its strength would be too 
difficult. 
The easy detection of the kind of corruption we 
consider here has also implications for the top claim 
“successful termination”. In the discussion so far, we 
have not considered the “recovery” part of the 
“attack-corruption-detection-recovery chain” because 
it fits better in claims for the termination requirement 
than in those for the accuracy requirement. It is 
important to note that easy detection (important to 
meet the accuracy requirement) can be in conflict 
with the termination requirement, e.g., the existence 
of good detection mechanism might prompt 
adversaries to attempt to corrupt data, even though 
they know in advance that they will be detected, just 
for the purpose of creating so many incidents to 
prevent successful termination. Detection that is 
effective but occurs too late for recovery actions (like 
cancelling an invalid ballot and asking the voter to 
cast a new vote) might jeopardise not only the 
termination but the ‘trustedness’ requirement as well. 
V. FINAL REMARKS 
We have presented preliminary results of a 
multidisciplinary collaboration towards a case to 
support the use of an e-voting system implementing 
the Prêt à Voter scheme. We identified important 
components of such a case and proposed a possible 
organisation of the case in terms of four main 
requirements: accuracy, privacy, successful 
termination and ‘trustedness’. We have also shown 
examples of critical sub-claims (limited, in this paper, 
to the accuracy requirement) and of the kinds of 
argumentation and evidence needed to support those 
sub-claims.  
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